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Robert K. Merton's "Puritan Thesis" asserts a direct correlation between Puritan theo-
logical beliefs and participation in natural philosophy (what today would be known as sci-
ence). This essay corrects the misleading assumptions and conclusions brought about by
Merton's argument, by using the writings ofRobert Boyle. Boyle, whom Merton designated a
"Puritan scientist," wrote extensively on the connection between natural philosophy and the-
ology; and his writings demonstrate that the relationship between the two wasfar more com-
plex than the simplicity of Merton's thesis suggests.
The nearly contempcManeous occurrence
in European history of the Protestant Refor-
mation and the "Scientific Revokition" has led
many historians to attempt to link the trans-
formations of religion and science together.
For example, some have argued that Protes-
tant theology promoted or made more attrac-
tive the empirical and experimental philoso-
phy that attained dominance in the seventeenth
century. One of the more long lasting, and
perhaps one of the more misleading, of these
theories about Protestantism and Science is the
so-called "Puritan Thesis" of twentieth-cen-
tury American sociologist Robert K. Meilon.
In the essay, "Puritanism, Pietism and Sci-
ence," Merton asserts that Puritans were at-
tracted to and pursued science to a greater de-
gree than their contemporaries, because of the
tenets of their specific theology. Merton states:
|T|he Puritan ethic, as an ideal typical
expression of the value-attitudes basic
to ascetic Protestantism generally, so
canalized the interests of seventeenth
century Englishmen as to constitute one
important clement in the enhanced
cultivation of science.
Merton goes even further with the argument:
The deep-rooted religious interests of
the day demanded in llicir forceful
implications the systematic, rational.
and empirical study of Nature for the
glorification of God in His works and
lor the control of the corrupt world.'
Merton's thesis, accurate or not, has had a very
long reach. Many people still have a vague
idea that the strict, highly industrious and se-
rious tone that supposedly characterized Pu-
ritan life led many of them to become com-
mitted practitioners of natural philosophy.-
Besides propagating an oversimplified
and, in many ways, inaccurate conception of
the Puritans and their beliefs, Merton's use of
the views of various seventeenth-century natu-
ral philosophers as evidence for his thesis has
led to the incorrect categorization of many of
these individuals as definitively Puritan. One
such figure to whom Merton repeatedly re-
fers to in this context is Robert Boyle. In this
essay, I address two of the major difficulties
with Merton's thesis, by using the example
of Robert Boyle and his writings on the rela-
tionship between natural philosophy and the-
ology. Firstly, I demonstrate, by a succinct
examination of what a Puritan is, that the defi-
nition of Puritan used by Merton in the essay
is misleadingly over-generalized and incon-
sistent. This inconsistency means that
Merton's thesis is unable to provide an accu-
rate insight into the complexity of views on
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theology and natural philosophy held by fig-
ures like Robert Boyle. Secondly, I will ap-
ply the four tenets of "Puritanism" that Merton
identifies as being correlated to natural phi-
losophy to two of Robert Boyle's works on
the relationship between theology and natu-
ral philosophy. Applying Merton 's markers
of Puritanism to a close reading of Boyle in-
dicates that, far from articulating views on the
relationship between natural philosophy and
theology that indicate a strong Puritan pref-
erence, Boyle instead drew a boundary be-
tween natural philosophy and theology that
was expressly non-sectarian and general.
Boyle's theology and his relation of it to natu-
ral philosophy was not demanded or gener-
ated by the project of natural philosophy nor
of "'prevailing social values" as Merton would
like to argue.' Rather, as Boyle himself said:
I am not a Chi-istian because it is the
Religion of my Countrey and my
Friends.... I admit no mans opinions in
the whole lump, and have not scrupled,
on occasion, to own dissents from the
generality of learned men, whether
Philosophers or Divines: And when I
choose to travel in the beaten Road, 'tis
not because I find 'lis the Road, but
because I judge 'tis the Way.^
The complicated views of individuals like
Boyle regarding natural philosophy and sci-
ence do not fit into the neat matrix of "Puri-
tan" or "Anglican," and a picture of seven-
teenth-century science and religion contingent
on such categories fails to reveal the complex-
ity of the English historical situation. Merlon's
failure to examine in detail the thoughts of the
individuals he was anxious to classify as Puri-
tans means that, in nearly all cases, he used
such a blunt instrument of description that he
missed the rich complexity of the reality in
which men like Boyle operated. In letting
Boyle speak for himself, the competing ten-
sions that many natural philosophers experi-
enced, caused by both religious conservatives
and philosphic liberals, emerge with a clarity
and immediacy that Merton's use of statistical
categories fails to capture, (hi this essay, I have
always used the seventeenth-century terms
"natural philosophy" and "natural philoso-
pher," as the terms "science" and "scientist"
are modern and, therefore, as applied to the
seventeenth century, anachronistic.) In addi-
tion to the two stated goals, my very approach
in this essay, then, serves as an indirect meth-
odological critique of Merton's dependence on
statistical calculations of such categories as
educational background and Royal Society
membership to support his thesis of a causal
link between Puritanism, Pietism and science.
As the case of Robert Boyle shows, fortunately
or unfortunately, historical figures often defy
strict categorization, a fact that makes the suc-
cessful application of the sociological tool of
statistics quite difficult to achieve.
Defining the Puritans
The Puritans constituted an important
force in seventeenth-century England. His-
torian John Spurr describes the time:
England's stormy seventeenth century
was the puritan century, the era of the
"puritan revolution" when civil war and
revolution ushered in government by
the saints, and Protestant nonconfomi-
isls emerged as an undeniable and
ineradicable social and political force.^
But just who were these people called Puri-
tans, who wielded such influence in England?
I will not attempt to provide an all-encom-
passing definiti(Mi of the Puritans here, as it is
a project far beyond the scope of this essay;
but a brief overview is important to correct-
ing some of the problems of Merton's argu-
ment.
The label of "Puritan" has a long and var-
ied history. From its earliest usage, in the lat-
ter part of the sixteenth century, as a mocking
insult suggesting self-righteousness and hy-
pocrisy, to its later anti-monarchical political
implications in the seventeenth, "Puritan" as
a temi has carried with it numerous and dif-
ferent stereotypes.^ These stereotypes also
extended to actions or attitudes that allegedly
sprang from Puritan beliefs. Various histori-
ans have sought to define Puritans in a way
that goes beyond these kinds of broad gener-
alization, focusing on the Puritan's spiritual
self-identity, rather than on what they did.
David Sceats describes the Puritans this way:
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...those commitled to pushing to its
logical conclusion the programme of
reform in the English Church initiated
in the time of King Edward VI, but
interrupted by Queen Mary's reign of
terror.^
Puritans were in favor of thorough and real
reform, but for the most part mainstream Pu-
ritans did not advocate separating from the
Church of England. Their concern was the
reform of the English church from within, and
most Puritans abhorred the label of "Separat-
ist." Their commitment to refomi was in some
cases radical, but not to the degree that it
wished to subvert the entire structure of the
Anglican Church. As historian Patrick
Collinson describes, Puritans could be distin-
guished from their English Protestants neigh-
bors by "everything that separated real from
merely formal Protestants."**
Most of the historical literature on Puri-
tans focuses, as John Spurr notes, on what
Puritans did, whether that was lobbying for
the reform of the
Elizabethan church in
the early seventeenth
century, leading a po-
litical reform in the






reaction after the restoration of the monarchy.
This tendency to define Puritans based on their
response to their circumstances has meant that
it often appears impossible to define just what
a Puritan is, since their description is seem-
ingly contingent on their environment at a
particular historical moment. Yet Puritans
throughout the seventeenth century did have
a common spiritual heritage, which, although
it underwent change, still kept as its main aim
the pursuit of individual salvation as well that
of the English Church at large. Both a strong
strain of rational analysis and the experience
of the heiul characterized Puritan spirituality
—Puritans sought to find in themselves the
marks of grace as evidence of their election.
Such marks could only be recognized through
the work of grace upon the heart, but the un-
derstanding of the work of grace could only
come through reasoned meditation. Ascer-
taining these marks of grace was central to
puritan theology, for it linked directly with
the doctrine of Election, the idea that some
were predestined for salvation, while others
were damned. Only God truly knew who was
assured and who was not, but individuals
could gain assurance by finding the signs of
grace in their own lives. Thus, "the hope and
desire for (election], the awareness of it, and
the assurance of it, were fundamental to the
Puritan religion."" For this reason, much of
puritan literature, sermons and otherwise, is
preoccupied not only with impressing upon
the audience the importance of receiving
grace, but also with the intricate analysis of
such heartfelt experiences; for the Puritans
were in no way pure spiritualists, and faith
without reason was no faith at all. What links
Boyle argued that natural philosophy simply
cannot encompass the divine^ and to argue
for a theology and a God that can be totally
grasped through the application of reason to
the natural order is arrogantly to overreach
the limits ofhuman reason.
Puritans together across the seventeenth cen-
tury was this theology which combined rea-
son and empirical spiritual experience cen-
tered on the pursuit of individual salvation.
In his history of seventeenth-century English
Puritanism, Spurr writes:
We should remember that the goal of
English puritans was not literary
monuments, nor was it political power:
it was the kingdom of heaven....
[Wjhat they did, what they achieved,
was in their own eyes ultimately less
important than why they did it and who
they were: God's people.'"
In light of this description of the Puritans,
how do Merton's uses of the term compare?
Merton claims in a preface to his essay to be
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using the term Puritan to designate all Protes-
tant groups in seventeenth-century England,
a use he deemed acceptable, because he be-
lieved that all such groups shared a core set
of religious and ethical convictions (a dubi-
ous proposition at best). Such a generaliza-
tion is far outside the historian's ordinary use
of Puritan, for which Merton excuses himself,
saying that his interest was "social rather than
ecclesiastical." " Yet within his essay, Merton
definitely uses "Puritan"
to designate a much nar-
rower band of English
Protestants, particularly
with regard to the mem-
bership of the Royal So-
ciety, a scientific society
officially founded after
the restoration of the monarchy in the i660s.
His equation of the terms Protestant and Pu-
ritan has been shown to be a great oversim-
plification, as has his argument that the ma-
jority of members of the Royal Society had
Puritan affiliation.'- The reality of post-Res-
toration English religion, characterized as it
was by the Anglicans and numerous "dissent-
ers"—hidependents, Presbyterians, Quakers,
with those who might be called Puritans
spread across the spectrum of these sects
—
means that many of the individuals Merton
wants to single out as Puritans, such as Rob-
ert Boyle, do not fall into any neatly defin-
able sectarian or theological category.'^ Nor
can all of these different Protestants be easily
classified as "pro-" or "anti-science" in a
simple sense. All of the members of the Royal
Society shared an interest in science, but how
they worked out that interest in relation to
religious convictions or lack thereof was dif-
ferent for each individual.
So, in some sense, Merton's use of "Puri-
tan" is shorthand for Protestimt, and even more
than that, it is shorthand for a set of social
values that he saw operating in seventeenth-
century England. Merton noted four major
tenets of "Puritanism" that directly linked
natural philosphy and theology: (a) the pres-
ence of an immutable law which must be dis-
covered and obeyed in both the order of na-
ture and in that of theology, (b) the relation-
ship between empiricism and rationalism, (c)
the theological requirement for industry so
aptly filled by natural philosophy, and (d) the
utility of both pursuits.'^ Do these four tenets
match up with the ideas of the natural phi-
losophers that Merton is discussing?
In the following sections, I apply in turn
each of Merton's four "Puritan" tenets to two
works by Robert Boyle that deal specifically
In Boyle'sframeworky God's revelation to
the individual, not immutable divine law,
is paramountfor both natural philosophy
and theology.
with the relationship of natural philosophy and
theology: The Excellency of'Theology, Com-
pared with Natural Philosophy (1674), and
"The Cliristian Virtuoso" ( 1690). The fonner
was written as an extended letter to a "friend"
who, having been lead astray by the fleeting
glories of natural philosophy, had failed to
give theology its proper place of primacy in
the pursuit of knowledge. The latter was writ-
ten by Boyle with the intention of demonstrat-
ing that natural philosophy and theology were
not incompatible, and that there was no in-
consistency between being a "virtuoso" of
natural philosophy and a Christian.
Boyle was born in 1 626 and died in 1 69 1
.
He is perhaps best known for the law that bears
his name, relating the pressure and volume of
gases. He lived through the English Civil War
and the Restoration of the monarchy, with all
the concomitant religious transformations.
Although Merton labels him a "moderate Pu-
ritan," it is difficult to ascertain what this
would mean or where Boyle fits in among the
many Protestant sects of the time. He did, as
historian of science Reijer Hooykaas notes,
have several influential non-conformist
friends, such as Thomas Syndenham—a phy-
sician with connections to Oliver Cromwell
—
and John Eliot, who would later become a mis-
sionary to North American Indians. He also
did write, during his teens, a narrative of his
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conversion, a type of biographical writing
common among more stringent Protestant
sects such as the Puritans. Yet, Uke many in
the post-Restoration era, in which the Resto-
ration church settlement left many so-called
non-conformists both inside and outside the
Anglican church, spread among various
groups, Boyle does not fit any one sectarian
category easily.'"^ Boyle was, Merton states,
"one of the scientists who attempted explicitly
to link the place of science in social life with
other cultural values." '^ Boyle did not see him-
self mainly as a natural philosopher, but as an
individual who pursued natural philosophy as
part of a larger quest after whatever knowl-
edge of the divine was graspable by human
reason. While some of his writings were, as
Mellon terms them, "apologia|s] for science"
to religion, in many of his works Boyle was
equally—if not more—concerned with main-
taining the distinct superiority of theology to
natural philosophy.'^ He was not only one of
the foremost natural philosophers of his day,
but also, Hooykaas notes, "takes his place
among the eminent apologists of Christian re-
ligion." "* In these two essays, especially in
The Excellency of Theology, Compared with
Natural Philosophy (hereafter referred to as
The Excellency of Theology) Boyle did make
a case for the connection between natural phi-
losophy and theology, but is was not made to
legitimate natural philosophy to the theologi-
cal community, as Merton's thesis argues. In
the following sections of the essay, I will show
that Boyle's aim in making the connection be-
tween theology and natural philosophy was to
re-establish the primacy of theology, to which
natural philosophy was a subordinate, if im-
portant, pursuit.
God's immutable law: the com-
mon foundation of Boyle's theol-
ogy and natural philosophy?
One prominent connection between "Pu-
ritanism" and natural philosophy made by
Merton is that both entail belief in an "immu-
table law." In religion, Merton states, Puri-
tan theology asserted the immutable law of
predestination, under which the fate of an
individual's soul was predetermined and set
by God. In science, this immutable law was
that of the divine order of nature, which could
be discovered through experimental philoso-
phy, but not altered or manipulated. Both
natural philosophy and theology were, in a
way, detenuinistic; and through the devoted
study of natural philosophy, one could con-
tinually acknowledge the divine law which
had created the order of the natural world.
'''
This link of immutable law is the baseline for
Merton's "Puritan" science. Protestants, be-
cause of their theology of the absolute law of
predestination, were required to engage indus-
triously in the world, interpreting their spiri-
tual experiences both rationally and empiri-
cally. Through the continuous evaluating of
spiritual experience by reason, individuals
could hope to determine whether they bore
the marks of God's grace, a sign of their indi-
vidual salvation. The study of the order of
nature and of the immutable laws underlying
it was an ideal arena for this interaction be-
tween industry and empiricism. Merton is
correct to draw attention to the link between
the immutable divine law of nature's order and
the interests of Protestants in pursuing its
study. Robert Boyle echoed the position
Merton has described when he writes in The
Excellency of Theology:
But as the two great Books, of Nature
and of Scripture, have the same Author;
so the study of the latter docs not at all
hinder the study of the former.
The study of natural philosophy can even lead
the mind "directly to the acknowledgment and
adoration of the most intelligent powerful and
benign author of things," Boyle stated in "The
Christian Virtuoso."'"
Yet, while the immutable law of God's
natural order is a pan of Boyle's understand-
ing of the relationship between theology and
natural philosophy, it is not the cornerstone.
Boyle did accept natural philosophy as able
to discern substantial knowledge about God
through the rational study of nature; yet such
a religion was, for him, insufficient and, in
the end, unsatisfying. In The Excellency of
Theology, Boyle argued that natural philoso-
phy simply cannot encompass the divine, and
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to argue for a theology and a God that can be
totally grasped through the application of rea-
son to the natural order is arrogantly to over-
reach the limits of human reason:
So although bare Reason well iniprov'd
will suffice to make a man behold many
glorious Attributes in the Deity; Yet the
same Reason, when assisted by
Revelation, may enable a man to
discover far more excellencies in God,
and perceive them, that he contem-
plated before, far greater and more
distinctly.-'
Merton's statement that natural philosophy
and theology were linked for "Puritans" be-
cause both were founded on immutable di-
vine laws does not reveal the logic that un-
derlay Boyle's integration of the two. For
The twoforms of empiricism contributed
to two levels of the understanding of the
divine; spiritual empiricism the truths
about God^s own nature and willy natural
philosophical empiricism data about
God^s order of nature.
Boyle, natural philosophy and religion were
related on the basis of what each could offer
to the individual, not in Merton's sense of
the theological demand that each individual
take responsibility for personal salvation and,
thus, pursue the study God's creation, but
rather in the sense of the elevation of an
individual closer to knowledge of the divine
will. As Boyle wrote in Tlie Excellency of
Theology:
[The individual may] know something
of the Nature of God by the Light of
Reason, yet we must owe the knowl-
edge of His Will or Positive Laws to
His own Revelation.-'
And later in the text Boyle wrote:
[Through revelation, God shows] there
are Discoveries more valuable than
those which relate but to the Objects
that he has expos'd to all men's Eyes.-^
Individuals can and should study nature to
discover which attributes of God are con-
tained therein, but such a contemplation of
nature is incomplete without the addition of
God's revelation, as may be found through
the scriptures and the study of theology. In
Boyle's framework, God's revelation to the
individual, not immutable divine law, is
paramount for both natural philosophy and
theology.
Rationalism and empiricism in
Protestant theology and science:
identical or parallel concepts?
In Merton's argument, science and theol-
ogy are linked not only by the two forms of
divine immutable law, but also because both
are founded on a combination of rationalism
: and empiricism. For
Merton, these ideas also
connect science and the-
ology thiough the ideas of
the Protestant work ethic
and of utility, tenets of
"Puritanism" that I exam-
ine below in two sections
of this essay. Theologi-
ically, Puritanism did have
both rational and empiri-
cal strains. Puritans, al-
though undoubtedly intluenced by earlier
scholastic theology, liked to described their
theology as "practical affectionate divinity"
which was, "a theology that engaged with
—
indeed arose from—experience, context and
situation, seeing itself as the handmaid of
godliness." '^ Spiritual experience required
rational analysis to be understood, but reason
without empirical experience permitted only
a superficial understanding.
Merton is correct in saying that there was
a link between empiricism in natural philoso-
phy and in spiritual experience. Both placed
strong emphasis on the individual's gaining
insight through direct personal experience.
Spiritually, one could truly know God only
through a direct experience in which God
touched the heart. Philosophically, true
knowledge was gained by actually observing
and measuring the data oneself. Yet beyond
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this shared emphasis on the real presence of
the individual, the theological and philosophi-
cal concepts of empiricism were rather dif-
ferent. Boyle's emphasis on revelation dem-
onstrated the key distinction between the two:
Reason cannot discover Truths [about
God] but when Revelation once
sufficiently propos'd tiicm to Her, she
can readily embrace and highly value
diverse of them.-''
Revelation could, in the form of spiritual ex-
perience, provide the material of Divine
Truths, which could be shaped by reason,
whereas empirical natural philosophical ex-
perience could provide observations and data
by which reason could construct hypotheses
about the natural world. The two fonns of
empiricism thus contributed to two levels of
the understanding of the divine; spiritual em-
piricism the truths about God's own nature
and will, natural philosophical empiricism
data about God's order of nature. Philosophi-
cal empiricism was insufficient, as God could
not be seen only with a "Philosophical eye";
and Boyle argued that, as a result, far better
conceptions ofGod had been "penned by fish-
ennen and early Christians" (who placed a
greater premium on spiritual empiricism) than
by most Greek, Roman, and Chinese philoso-
phers.^'' Rather than being a double applica-
tion of an identical concept, as Merton argues,
in Boyle's The E.xcclleiicy of Theology, the
meaning of the link between rationalism and
empiricism takes two distinct but parallel
paths, in religion and natural philosophy re-
spectively. Rationalism and empiricism did
link natural philosophy with theology in
Boyle's eyes; but again, the theological ver-
sion of the relationship, emphasizing the cen-
trality of the empirical experience of the re-
ception of revelation, was the superior one.
A shelter from sin: natural philosophy
and the "Protestant work ethic"
"The combination of rationalism and em-
piricism which is so pronounced in the Puri-
tan ethic forms the essence of the spirit of
modern science," Merton states, and this link
between science and theology is also evident
in the related theme of the "Puritan work
ethic." The rigorous application of reason to
empirical experience would ensure that indi-
viduals did not fall prey to the temptation of
sin. The demand of Puritanism for "system-
atic, methodic labour," and "constant dili-
gence in one's calling" matches perfectly to
experimental natural philosophy, with its re-
quirement to study all aspects of nature em-
pirically, Merton claims. The eschewing of
idleness by Puritans as a means of avoiding
sinful temptations again is a natural fit with
the demands of experimental philosophy.
Rather than being tempted by vice, one can
occupy oneself with experiments.-^ The Ex-
cellency of Theology does have some refer-
ences to these advantages of natural philoso-
phy. Boyle noted that God gave human be-
ings reason, "which permits the study of
Natural Philosophy by its exercise," and in
doing so, they may come to a greater knowl-
edge of God's attributes.-** Again, though,
Boyle deemed natural philosophy insufficient
both as a means of obtaining knowledge of
God and as a motivator for worthwhile in-
dustry and guard against temptation. For in
Boyle's eyes, the contemplation of theologi-
cal truths increased the piety and virtue of
the contemplator. He wrote:
ISludics of Divine truths] not onely
Restrain One undue Passion, but
Advance all vertucs, and free us from
all Servile Fears of the Deity: and tend
to give us a strong and well-grounded
Hope in Him.-''
For Boyle, natural philosophy was not the
primary source of valuable occupation, but
it did elucidate a method that, if applied to
theology, could render it even more valu-
able. "Nor do I doubt, but that a much
greater progress might be made in the Dis-
covery of Subjects where, though we can
never know all. we may still know farther,"
Boyle stated, when speaking of theology.
Rigorous analysis was far more produc-





Speculative Geniuses would pro-
posed to themselves particular Doubts
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and Enquiries about particular Attributes,
and frame and examine Hypotheses,
establish Theorems, draw Corollaries;
and (in short) apply to this study the
same sagacity, assiduity and attention of
mind which they often employ about
inquiries of a very much inferior nature
I
a far more comprehensive knowledge of
God could be achieved |.-"
The focus of one's industry should be ratio-
nal analysis of God's revelation, to which
natural philosophy might contribute some in-
sight into God's natural order or a method of
analysis. For Boyle, theology remained as the
dominant partner in relationship to natural
philosophy.
The usefulness of theology
compared to natural philosophy
Experimental philosophy was a means of
earnest activity, but activity that was of ser-
vice to the world. This melded, according to
Merton, with the "Puritan" bias against the
withdrawal of monastic life and their spiritual
goal of "the good of many." In short, Merton
argues, "science embodies two highly prized
values: utilitarianism and empiricism." ^'
Boyle did see natural philosophy as useful,
but its primary utility was in pointing indi-
viduals towards a greater acknowledgment
of God's glory. This argument is especially
Boyle was concerned with those who
professed belief in the veracity of the scrip-
tures butfor whom a natural philosophy
without divine revelation had come to
assume a place ofprimacy in explaining
the world.
clear in "The Christian Virtuoso," where he
stated:
And indeed, the experimental philoso-
phy giving us a more clear discovery,
than strangers to it, of the divine
excellencies displayed in the fabrick and
conduct of the universe. ..very much
indisposeth the mind, to ascribe such
admirable effects to so incompetent and
pitiful a cause as blind chance, or the
tumultuous justlings of atomical
portions of senseless matter; and leads it
directly to the acknowledgment and
adoration of a most intelligent, powerful
and benign author of things....^'
Merton rightly notes that the need for indus-
trious occupation that would enable the indi-
vidual to glorify God is one link between the
utility of natural philosophy and religion; yet
what is striking in the Boyle texts is his rela-
tive weighting of theology over natural phi-
losophy. In The Excellency of Theology,
Boyle wrote of using a "balance" to "show
that [natural philosophy's] Excellencies,
though solid and weighty are less so than the
prepondering ones of theology."^' Theology
not only drew one more closely into an un-
derstanding of the divine, but also had ends
and goals that were ultimately far more use-
ful than those of natural philosophy.
The Benefits which men may receive
from the Divine, surpass those which
they receive from the Naturalist, both in
the Nobleness of the Advantages and in
the Duration of them, [for] the boasted
use of Natural philosophy, by its
advancing Trades and Physick, will still
be to serve the Body; which is but the
Lodging and Instrument of the Soul.^''
Theology, thus, could always claim to be the
supremely utilitarian object of study, for it
M alone dealt with the true
i nature and state of the
soul. Natural philoso-
phy, in Boyle's mind,
was indissoluably linked
to theology, as it gave
the individual a greater
understanding of God's
attributes; but it was
never sufficient unto it-
I : self to provide full theo-
i logical understanding.
What of Merton 's claim that "Puritans"
were particularly concerned with "the good
of many" and were, thus, united with Francis
Bacon. Bacon, according to Merton, believed
in the power of science to improve the "ma-
terial condition of man," which, "apart from
its purely mundane value," was "a good in
the light of the Evangelical Doctrine of Sal-
vation by Jesus Christ."" Boyle had his sus-
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picions about the benefits that could be gen-
erally derived from natural philosophy.
Whereas the study of theology benefited all
individuals equally, natural philosophy was
less egalitarian. Many improvements that re-
sulted from the work of natural philosophy
"prejudiced one sort of Men as much as they
Advantage another." ^'' Natural philosophy
had its own particular uses, but theology was
the source of universal improvement and,
thus, had superior value.
Just as the skill of a jeweller is
preferable than that of a mason because
of the nobleness of the object [where
we know upon tradition the value of
jewels over common stones], so a more
dim and imperfect knowledge of God,
and the Mysteries of Religion, may be
more desirable, and upon that account
more delightful, than a clearer knowl-
edge of those Inferior Truths that
Physicks are wont to teach."
Boyle believed that natural philosophy gained
its true utility only when inspiring the indi-
vidual toward the study of theology, a pursuit
that would always generate truths far supe-
rior to those discovered through natural phi-
losophy.
Boyle's project: re-establishing
the priority of theology
If, as Merton's thesis argues, the seven-
teenth century was the age of "Puritan sci-
ence," why did Boyle bother to write such
lengthy expositions of the relationship be-
tween theology and natural philosophy? One
would suppose that the natural philosophic
community, if dominated by "Puritans,"
would be in full agreement with his arguments
for the supremacy of revealed theology, thus
rendering his project superfluous. Boyle's
essays depict a picture of the natural philo-
sophic community that differs from Merton's
thesis. In his preface to The Excellency of
Theology, Boyle lamented:
The undervaluation of the study of
things sacred is not his [a friend's] fault
alone, but is grown so rife among many
(otherwise ingenious) Persons,
especially Studiers of Physicks, that I
wish the ensuing Discourse were much
less seasonable than I fear it is.^**
Directly in contrast to Merton's argument that
natural philosophers were chiefly concerned
with making natural philosophy acceptable to
a dominant theology, Boyle stated that it was
students of "Physicks," in particular, who were
prone to demoting theology below natural phi-
losophy. Natural philosophers had fallen prey
to undervaluing theology, because of
...a certain secret Pride, grounded upon
a Conceit, that the Attainments of
Natural Philosophers are so noble a
kind and argue so iransccndent an
Excellency of Parts in the Attaincr, that
he may justly undervalue all other
Learning, without excepting Theology
itself.'"
^
But notable in Boyle's comments is his stress
on the undervaluation of theology. Boyle was
not writing to atheists, agnostics, or skeptics,
for if he were, Boyle stated that his argument
would have been different, focusing much
more on scriptural proofs. Boyle was con-
cerned with those who professed belief in the
veracity of the scriptures but for whom a natu-
ral philosophy without divine revelation had
come to assume a place of primacy in explain-
ing the world. Theology was being subsumed
into natural philosophy, rather than being
maintained as superior. He was, thus, not
seeking to demonstrate the religious value of
science to an atheistic community, but rather
to combat what he saw as an insufficient natu-
ral theology, and to reconfigure the relation-
ship between natural philosophy and theology.
Boyle's specific focus, as evidenced by his
repeated references to "your friend Descartes"
in addressing the intended recipient of The
Excellency of Theology, was on those follow-
ers of Descartes who were described as de-
ists. Deism in Boyle's time, as Hooykaas
notes, is "customarily defined as the doctrine
that God gave the world its laws and left it to
its fate," although there were many deists who
did "acknowledge God's constant concern for
creation."^" Perhaps a better definition of de-
ists would be the following: those who ne-
glect "revealed religion [and] argue that the
natural light (i.e., that of reason) is sufficient
to arrive at pure religion."^' Natural philoso-
phers who subscribed to this view believed
they could arrive at all sufficient knowledge
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of God through reason and study of the natu-
ral world. God's revelation outside of that of
the natural order, thus, had little importance.
Descartes was often taken as a model in this
strain of thought, with his rational arguments
for the existence of God, which could be ar-
rived at by human reason alone. Natural phi-
losophy, for Descartes' followers, assumed a
place of primacy among other types of learn-
ing, not because naturalists were atheists or
skeptics, but because their view of religion
put such a premium on natural theology, or
on that which could be discovered by a com-
bination of rational and empirical study of
nature. Boyle sought to reassert the impor-
tance of the rational and empirical study of
theology. Spiritual experience and revelation
were two key elements of theology that could
not be grasped through the study of nature.
In these two essays, Boyle strove to prove that
reason alone was insufficient. In The Excel-
lency of Theology, Boyle constructed a brief
dialogue between himself and his imagined
audience of deists. He argued that the im-
mortal nature of the soul could be ascertained
only with assurance through God's revelation.
"Yet didn't Descartes demonstrate the immor-
tality of the soul by reason only?" Boyle's
imagined audience asks. No, Boyle would
answer, for all the Cartesian proof offers is a
rational demonstration that the soul is distinct
from the body, not that it continues on after
the destruction of the body. For Boyle, such
a proof is an example of the failure of natural
philosophy to match the elevation offered by
theology and divine revelation. The Carte-
sian proof, he wrote, is good for "Atheists,
Epicureans and other men. Naturalists who
will not allow God to have anything to do in
the case."^- For natural philosophers who
profess to be Christians, it was insufficient,
and presented a flawed relation between natu-
ral philosophy and theology.
At the heart of Boyle's arguments was his
desire to maintain the proper connection be-
tween the two, in the face of the dangerous
conflation of theology with natural philosophy
offered by the deists. The natural theology
expounded by the deists marginalized theol-
ogy into the mere partner of philosophy. What
Boyle was arguing against, in one sense, was
the secularization of natural philosophy sug-
gested by the deist conception of the relation
between natural philosophy and theology, with
its devaluing of revelation. One of Boyle's
chief concerns was to define "the natural phi-
losopher" in such a way that interest in theol-
ogy was not only a pemiissible, but an inte-
gral part. "Men can be philosophers who also
study Divine Learning," Boyle stressed in The
Excellency of Theology; natural philosophers
should not be limited to the study of natural
philosophy.^' As Boyle argued:
[I am] no Lecturer or Professor of
Physicks, nor have ever engaged myself
by any Promise made to the Publick, to
confine myself, never to write of any
other subject. Nor is it Reasonable, that
what I did or may write, to gratifie
other mens Curiosity should deprive me
of mine Own Liberty, and Confine me
to One Subject.^
Boyle wished to restore the relationship be-
tween theology and natural philosophy to one
where theology was universally accepted as
the cornerstone discipline, so that natural phi-
losophers' interest in theology could only en-
hance their natural philosophic work.
In "The Christian Virtuoso" and in The
Excellency ofTheology, Boyle argued for natu-
ral philosophy and theology to be integrated;
but he did not advocate a relationship in which
theology became simply another basis for the
rational methods of natural philosophy, as de-
ists who argued that God could be found purely
through reason and the study of nature did. In
his "Puritan thesis," Merton correctly distin-
guishes several points of correlation between
natural philosophy and theology, but his con-
ception that men like Boyle were chiefly in-
terested in making natural philosophy accept-
able to their faith leads him to misunderstand
that governing belief in Boyle's case was the-
ology, rather than natural philosophy. Boyle
valued natural philosophy highly, but the de-
terminant element in the relation of natural
philosophy to theology was theology. Natural
philosophy and theology did share the idea of
an immutable law, but it was revelation, for
24 The Journal of Faith and Science Exchange^ 2000
Boyle, that set the phice of natural philosophy
in relation to theology. Empiricism and ratio-
nalism were needed in faith and philosophy,
but spiritual empirical experience and rational
analysis of revelation would bring assurance
of the most important Divine truths. Industry
and utility could be practiced in natural phi-
losophy, but through theology one's work was
elevated and the results made ultimately use-
ful. In all aspects, it was theology that deter-
mined the role of natural philosophy in Boyle's
understanding of the connection between the
two, a role which was always of secondary im-
portance relative to that of theology. Boyle's
arguments did not demonstrate a particular sec-
tarian agenda, nor an advocacy of the profes-
sion of natural philosophy to the religious com-
munity, despite what Merton's thesis would
suggest. His chief concern was to maintain a
meaningful position for theology in light of
the growing encroachment of a more secular-
ized natural philosophy. Instead of the work
of a "Puritan" natural philosopher, Boyle's
writings can be seen as an early contribution
to the long-lasting«and broader debate over the
propriety and nature of the relationship be-
tween theology and natural philosophy.
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